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Adecade after its formation, the SouthAfrican Police Service (SAPS) has settledinto its own distinctive style of grassroots
policing. This style is rudimentary and is fashioned
to execute a narrow range of tasks. At station level,
crime hotspots are identified and members of the
station’s centralised crime prevention unit are
mobilised into high density saturation teams; they
move into hotspots in numbers, throw up
roadblocks, cordon-and-search, and search-and-
seize. This style of policing is not so much about
solving problems as smothering them in short, sharp
bursts. 
Is this manner of policing set in stone? Ten years into
the SAPS’ history, is the institution still capable of
substantive innovation and creativity? The
introduction of sector policing in Johannesburg’s
West Rand, which began in April 2003, suggests that
the substance of grassroots policing can in fact
change rapidly and successfully.
Working against a great deal of resistance from
middle management – and a great deal of scepticism
from senior managers in other provinces – the West
Rand Area has, without doubt, successfully instituted
a new style of policing and police culture in its 11
constituent stations. This article briefly describes
what changed and how the changes were effected.
Sector policing 
Sector policing is a vague and amorphous term
which has been through a thousand definitions and
redefinitions. In terms of the draft National
Instruction issued by the SAPS national commissioner
in December 2003, it entails dividing police stations
into sectors and convening community–police sector
crime forums (SCFs) in each sector. The changes to
policing envisaged by the Instruction are
organisationally modest. It envisages only that one or
two personnel be redeployed from patrol and
response work to set up SCFs. It is quite possible for
police stations to implement the letter of the
instruction without introducing substantive changes
to grassroots policing.
Yet the philosophy behind sector policing is a good
deal more substantial than that. The rationale for
dividing station jurisdictions into sectors is to get
small teams of police officials to know particular
neighbourhoods intimately. The idea is not only that
they will get to know their sector’s crime trends well,
but – with thought, innovation, and the necessary
organisational support – will be able to identify the
specific problems that fuel specific crime trends, and
to solve or manage those problems. 
Thus, while old fashioned SAPS policing would
respond to a spate of vehicle thefts by throwing up
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roadblocks around vehicle theft hotspots on a
Saturday morning, sector policing would try to
identify what in the physical and social environment
caused the hotspot to emerge and how to tackle
those causes. The assumption is that police members
immersed in detailed, local knowledge are best
placed to identify and solve problems.
It is an ambitious policing philosophy; it demands
that officials who have spent their working lives
following instructions begin thinking creatively. And
it demands that an organisational culture driven by
rapid responses to short term problems reorient itself
to the tasks of long term problem-solving.
West Rand interpretation of sector policing
The manner in which sector policing was introduced
in the West Rand was risky and ambitious. Each
police station was stripped entirely of its centralised
capacity; every operational detective and uniformed
branch member was allocated to a sector. The
station level crime prevention unit – historically the
core of visible policing capacity, which allows
station managers to police hotspots in numbers –
was disbanded. 
Instead, day-to-day visible policing capacity was
permanently distributed into the sectors. Sector
policing thus had to work because every other
capacity was stripped. Either the decentralised
organisation policed by solving sector based
problems, or policing simply did not work at all.
There was no alternative. Much rode, then, on the
SAPS Area management’s capacity to institute
significant changes in policing culture and practice
throughout the organisation quickly and on the hoof.
Yet if the vision was ambitious, the implementation
was cautious. First, it was slow and incremental. The
first sectors were launched in April 2003, while the
last are expected to emerge in early 2005. The
principle was that no sector was to be launched
without the resources to sustain a dedicated 24-hour
patrol and response vehicle and a permanent sector
based team of at least eight uniform branch
members. 
The resource and personnel increases that have
accompanied the introduction of sector policing
have also been substantial. Roodepoort police
station, for instance, had a staff complement of 180
members in the year before its first sectors were
launched. At time of writing, shortly after the
launch of its ninth sector, its police personnel
number was 340. In Kagiso, the number rose from
134 to more than 200 over a 19-month period.
Most incoming personnel were recruited directly
from police college.
What West Rand sector police are expected to do
The tasks of each police official in each sector can
be divided into two broad categories. The first
consists of simple and repetitive tasks. The second
demands thought and innovation.
Simple tasks: risk identification and targeted
patrolling
Each sector gives a monthly presentation to a senior
Area manager. The sector police present their
monthly crime statistics and note which crimes
have increased and which have decreased. They
then present a map on which the sector’s crimes are
plotted. Crime increases are thus marked not only
by type, but by geography, time of day, and day of
the week. Hotspots are marked in red. Each is
discussed individually – how it was policed last
month, how it will be policed next month.
The first stage in this exercise is rudimentary and
routine – it is about how to design targeted patrols
and police risk factors. If the sector’s primary
problem is gun related predatory crimes, the sector
is expected to conduct serial stop-and-search
procedures in the vicinity of the hotspot at the times
of day and days of the week at which the crimes
are concentrated. If the sector’s problem is
residential burglary, the area is mapped for hotspots,
access routes and open fields. Vehicles and
pedestrians are to be serially stopped and searched
at appropriate times and places.
The evaluation of members’ enthusiasm in
performing targeted patrols is rudimentary but stern.
The name of each member is paraded before the
meeting, together with a list of the arrests he made
and the goods he confiscated the previous month –
all on a Powerpoint presentation. If a sector’s
violent crime has increased, the rate of arrests for
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drunkenness is low, and the number firearms it has
confiscated is paltry, it is performing its most basic
functions poorly and is told so. Alternatively, if a
member has only arrested illegal immigrants, and
cannot explain why targeting them is reducing
identified crime patterns, he is told he has been
wasting his time.
Complex tasks: problem-solving
Once hotspots have been mapped, the sector
manager presents a photograph of each hotspot.
The idea is to understand each hotspot as a physical
and social terrain, and thus to attach its crime
patterns to specific problems. Members are
encouraged to find environmental and situational
causes of crimes in hotspots and to offer target-
hardening solutions. They are also obliged to record
how many civilians and civilian networks they have
contacted in hotspots, how they have approached
them, and what sort of crime prevention
partnerships they have established with them. 
Members must present a list of physical and social
factors throughout their sector that might contribute
to crime. These can range from broken street lights,
to unnumbered houses, the emergence of a group
of homeless children, the presence of street
gambling, unlit open spaces, the presence of vacant
houses, the opening of a taxi rank, and intermittent
power failures, to the emergence of a kangaroo
court in an informal settlement. Each factor is
discussed individually and solutions are proposed. 
Members are also obliged to search for these factors
by communicating with civilians. Members must list
how many civilians they contacted during the
previous month. They are also obliged to distribute
their dedicated sector cell phone number, and to
encourage residents to use it to lodge complaints
and to give and receive information. Finally, the
sectors are obliged to report on the composition of
their SCFs, the problems raised there, and the
solutions it has proposed.
Sector performance
The Area office’s expectations of what should
happen at the grassroots level are in reality pretty
modest. A sector that performs its rudimentary
functions well – risk identification and targeted
patrols – is considered by Area management to be
doing alright. A sector that has begun to dissolve its
hotspots into specific problems with specific causes
is considered to be exceptional. Sectors that are
slow to dissolve their hotspots into identifiable and
actionable problems are painstakingly coached in
the monthly meetings with Area management; Area
management grills the sector team until it begins to
think about problems and solutions.
The research showed that most, although not all,
sectors performed risk identification and targeted
patrolling with competence. Every sector attempted
to problem-solve, some with more success than
others. Successful problem-solving was always
conceptually very simple, but was extremely labour
intensive and required a great deal of dedication
and determination. Here are two examples of
successful problem-solving:
• In Roodepoort, a spate of night-time street 
crimes and disturbances were associated with a
particular neighbourhood tavern. The sector
manager attempted a host of measures to
badger patrons and the owner, from successive
raids, to constant breathalizer tests outside the
tavern, to stringent enforcement of licensing
laws. Finally, after painstaking work, the sector
manager discovered that the tavern proprietor
was several months behind in his rent. The
owner of the property was contacted and
pressured into issuing a final demand. This was
done, the tavern proprietor evicted and the
tavern closed.
• Kagiso police station’s sector four identified a 
pedestrian passageway on which people were
repeatedly robbed. Sector patrol officers
surmised that the perpetrators were among three
groups that regularly held dice games in the
streets around the passageway. They
periodically broke up groups of gamblers and
arrested them on petty offences, but they knew
that this was more of a cat-and-mouse game
than a lasting solution. They believed that the
best course of action would be to link specific
gamblers to specific crimes. They profiled four
or five gamblers, collected all the dockets of
robberies committed in the passageway and re-
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interviewed all complainants. Through this
process, charges were laid against four of the
people they had profiled and all were convicted.
The robberies in the passageway stopped.
Policing challenges
The introduction of sector policing in the West
Rand has led to qualitative changes in the
relationship between police and civilians. First,
police officers get to know a neighbourhood’s
victims and complainants personally and visa versa.
Second, as police responses to complaints become
quicker, more efficient and more predictable,
civilians begin to draw police into a wider range of
conflicts. These qualitative shifts in the relationship
between police and civilians have both benign and
destructive consequences. 
Mutual escalation
For those who do not want a police presence in
their neighbourhood, knowing officers individually
becomes a powerful tool. Police officers can be
repeatedly provoked until they break the law, or
sufficiently intimidated to desist from patrolling
certain areas. In one instance in Randfontein, it
appeared that this relationship of personalised,
mutual hostility rendered the very presence of the
police a provocation, and led to the escalation of
tension, the commission of crimes, and the
diversion of police resources from other areas. 
It is difficult to offer solutions to this problem. It is,
perhaps, an inevitable by-product of sector policing.
The police must inevitably respond by targeting
provocative individuals for action, but this is
precisely what provocative individuals want. Police
resources are diverted into continuing, low-intensity
conflicts.  
Informal delict 
As sector policing brings a surer and more
predictable police response to complaints, so it is
likely that civilians will increasingly use the justice
process as a form of surety – as a means to
underwrite systems of private and informal delict. In
other words, a victim will privately and informally
‘sue’ an offender and then call the police to open a
case. The justice process is kept in the wings, to be
triggered in the event that the offending party
reneges. Police officers resent this syndrome
immensely. They regard it as a corruption and
abuse of their work.
But in the absence of a sudden and unlikely
transformation of local cultures, this syndrome is
likely to remain, and sector officers will have to
manage it. What to do with it? It has both benign
and malignant possibilities. At its worst, it drags
officers into the tardy role of unwilling and
unwitting debt collectors. It forces officers to
respond to complaints which have been fabricated
for the purposes of blackmail and extortion. Yet, at
its best, police officers will assist in underwriting
informal systems of non-violent conflict resolution.
Thought should be given to how to realise this latter
possibility.
Domestic violence
A surer and more efficient police response to
complaints is probably also resulting in victims of
domestic violence calling the police with greater
frequency, and in the same officials being called to
the same addresses again and again. Within the
ambit of the law, a variety of different modus
operandi remain open to police officers responding
to domestic violence complaints. The manner in
which this discretionary space is filled is often
shaped by the officer’s character, values and beliefs:
• the degree of contempt with which an officer 
treats an offender in front of his family; 
• whether, and with how much urgency, an officer 
persuades a complainant to lay charges, or,
alternatively, to seek a protection order; 
• to what degree the presence of children in the 
house changes the officer’s behaviour and
demeanour; 
• the extent to which an officer is concerned only 
with whether a crime will be committed on his
shift, rather than the long term consequences of
his actions.
Research in other parts of the world shows that all
of these aspects of an officer’s demeanour at the
scene of a complaint either exacerbate or
ameliorate domestic violence.1 The research is
context-specific and its findings cannot simply be
transferred from one environment to another. In
South Africa, research on police conduct in private
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homes is scant, and police management is thus not
in a position to write policy in this regard. 
Now is probably a good time to begin that research.
As sector policing increasingly brings police into
intimate contact with civilians, much more should
be known about the long term consequences of an
increased police presence in conflict-ridden homes.
Conclusion
To the extent that the introduction of sector policing
on the West Rand has been a success, four factors
have made this possible:
• Institutional reform was far-reaching and 
ambitious, and central capacity was stripped.
The organisation had no choice but to get sector
policing right. Falling back on traditional styles
of policing was not possible.
• The Area management corps has grasped the 
concept of sector policing with enthusiasm,
rather than having it thrust upon them. The
importance of this point cannot be emphasised
too much. In most provinces and areas, sector
policing is to emerge from a National
Instruction. There is no guarantee that it will be
received by a willing corps of police leaders.
• The transition has undoubtedly benefited from 
the fact that a large proportion of sector
personnel are recently recruited police officers.
Sector policing is their first and only experience
of policing which means there are no old ways
to be unlearned.
• Veteran middle-ranking police officers’ first 
experience of sector policing has come in the
form of a dramatic increase in resources and
infrastructure, and a vastly improved managerial
support system. In other words, sector policing
has been coupled with unprecedented
improvements in the conditions of their working
lives and in their capacity to perform their work.
The combination of these four ingredients appears
to have been pivotal. Take one of them away, and
the introduction of sector policing may well have
been beset by a host of problems.
This article is drawn from a monograph on the same topic:
J Steinberg, Sector policing on the West Rand: Three case
studies, ISS Monograph Series No 110, Institute for
Security Studies, Pretoria, Dec 2004. 
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